AFRICAN MINING POLITICAL RISK PDAC SERIES  |  ARTICLE 2 OF 6

Election Transitions Are the Trigger

Every major mining policy shift in Africa was politically driven and triggered around elections or Military coups. Here’s how to predict the next one.

 

February 2026

 

In partnership with DTOS Mauritius

The Pattern Is Clear

When analysts discuss the wave of resource nationalism sweeping Africa, they tend to frame it in economic or structural terms: rising commodity prices, global energy transition demand, post-colonial rebalancing. These factors are real, but they obscure the most reliable predictor of when and how mining policy changes actually occur: election transitions.

The pattern is real and well-documented for elections and Military coups:

Tanzania: Tanzania’s transformative 2017 Mining Act — which introduced mandatory local shareholding, government free equity stakes, and a raft of new fiscal obligations — followed John Magufuli’s 2015 election on a platform explicitly targeting foreign mining companies.

DRC (Sicomines Renegotiation) came after Present Tshisekedi election in 2018, and intensified after his re-election in 2023 and visit to Beijing, and culminated in a new USD 7 Billion agreement announced during his second term inauguration.

Senegal (2024 contract reviews): President Bassirou Diomaye Faye landslide election victory in March 2024 was followed by announcements of comprehensive audits of mining, oil, and gas contracts.

Zambia (2021) Zambia’s post-2021 mining policy recalibration followed Hakainde Hichilema’s election victory.

Mali: the 2020 coup led by Colonel Assimi Goita produced the 2023 Mining Code, which grants the sate up to 35% equity in mining projects. The Mining Code emerged from a military government seeking to consolidate domestic legitimacy through resource sovereignty.

Burkina Faso: Followoing the 2020 coup, the military government has nationalised at least 2 mines previously owned by Canadian companies. the 2024 Mining Code established a state owned mining company as a primary vehicle for increased state control.

Niger: the 2023 coup lead to revocation of mining licences including France’s Orano uranium concession, and a pivot towards Russia.

In each case, the policy shift did not occur in a vacuum. It was preceded by identifiable signals: campaign rhetoric targeting mining companies, fiscal distress creating revenue imperatives, commodity price dynamics creating leverage, and political accelerators that made reform both popular and feasible.

Why Elections Matter More Than Economics

The conventional wisdom in mining investment is that commodity prices and geological fundamentals drive returns. Political risk is acknowledged but treated as background noise — something to be insured against or discounted in valuation models. This may be a fundamental misunderstanding of how African mining policy actually changes.

Consider the economics alone: copper prices can rise 30% over two years without any government touching its mining code. But let an election approach where the incumbent faces a credible challenger running on a platform of “our minerals, our future,” and the same price appreciation becomes the fiscal justification for a windfall tax, an increased royalty rate, or a mandatory equity dilution. The commodity price is the enabling condition; the electoral transition (whether or not the incumbent wins) is the trigger.

This distinction matters enormously for structuring decisions. A tax-optimised structure that assumes static fiscal terms is effectively betting that no election will produce a government motivated to change those terms. In an Africa where over a dozen countries hold national elections in any given 24-month window, and where resource nationalism is the single most popular policy platform across the political spectrum, that bet is increasingly a high risk one.

 

The 2026 Election Calendar and Mining Risk

Several near-term electoral events carry significant implications for mining investors:

Zambia (August 2026): President Hichilema’s investor-friendly positioning has made Zambia competitive against jurisdictions with more aggressive ownership requirements. But with an election approaching, the balance between resource nationalism aspirations and investment attraction will be tested. Any challenger will have strong incentives to promise greater state capture of mining revenues, particularly from the copper sector that is central to the Lobito Corridor strategy.

South Africa (ongoing coalition dynamics): The Government of National Unity’s stability is fragile, and the ANC’s draft Mineral Resources Development Amendment Bill signals the direction of travel regardless of coalition composition. Whoever holds the mining portfolio has political incentives to demonstrate sovereignty over mineral resources.

Senegal (legislative dynamics): President Faye’s government established a Special Commission to audit and review mining contracts, with renegotiation of key concessions explicitly on the agenda. The political capital invested in this process means outcomes are more visible and consequential.

DRC (post-2023 election implementation): Tshisekedi’s second term mandate is driving aggressive renegotiation of Chinese mining deals and expansion of state participation across the mining sector. The political timeline for delivering visible results to voters is compressing.

What Predictive Indicators Tell Us

At Effen Holdings, our political risk assessment framework tracks 11-16 indicators across three tiers to predict mining policy shifts with 75-90% accuracy. The primary drivers — campaign rhetoric specificity, fiscal distress levels, commodity price dynamics — provide early warning of whether an upcoming election is likely to produce meaningful mining policy change.

The critical insight is that not all elections produce mining policy shifts. Many do not. The framework distinguishes between elections where resource nationalism is rhetorical background noise and elections where specific, implementable policy proposals targeting the mining sector have been articulated by credible political actors. This distinction allows investors to focus their structuring efforts and risk mitigation resources on the elections that actually matter.

For investors preparing for the current environment, the question is not whether African mining policy will change — it will. The question is which specific changes, in which specific jurisdictions, on what timeline, and triggered by which political events - the kind of intelligence that converts political uncertainty into manageable, structurable risk.

 

Disclaimer: This article is published by Effen Holdings Ltd for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal, financial, or investment advice. Readers should consult qualified professional advisors before making any investment or structuring decisions. Contact us for a confidential review of your specific situation.

About Effen Holdings Ltd

Effen Holdings Ltd is a political risk intelligence company specialising in African investments. In partnership with DTOS Mauritius, we help investors structure for elections, not just tax — providing the foresight to anticipate policy shifts before they impact your portfolio.